Let us speak plainly. The ongoing charade at the National Assembly regarding electronic transmission of election results is not a debate about infrastructure. It is not a technical disagreement about network coverage. It is a premeditated assault on the credibility of the 2027 elections, dressed in the tattered robes of legislative procedure.
We must name the guilty parties. We must expose their tactics. And we must rebuke them with the force that this moment demands.
The Senate leadership, led by Senator Opeyemi Bamidele, has publicly defended their position by citing "stark realities" of Nigeria's communication infrastructure. They claim that making real-time electronic transmission mandatory could "trigger disputes and instability" .
This is a deliberate falsehood. Let us examine the evidence they are counting on you not to see.
As of 2023, the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) data tells a story of remarkable progress that the Senate conveniently ignores:
- 4G coverage: 84% of the population
- 3G coverage: 90% of the population
- 2G coverage: 94% of the population (sufficient for basic data transmission)
- Broadband subscriptions reached 92.5 million by February 2023, pushing penetration to 48.49%
The Senate leader selectively cited that "Nigeria achieved about 70 per cent broadband coverage in 2025" while internet user penetration stood at "44.53 per cent" . But these figures actually support electronic transmission, they do not undermine it.
Here is what the Senate "forgot" to mention: NIGCOMSAT-1R provides 100% rural connectivity capacity .
The Nigerian Communications Satellite Limited is currently executing "Project 774 LG Connectivity" - an initiative to connect all 774 local government areas with high-speed internet by the end of 2026 . Managing Director Jane Egerton-Idehen has confirmed that approximately 200 rural communities have already been linked to 2G and 3G services within recent months .
She issued a warning that should echo in every Senate chamber: "If we do not have that critical national asset and protect it, we will be cut off completely from communication in the event that big Western nations decide to cut off access" .
The Senate's response? Silence.
Minister of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy, Bosun Tijani, has outlined what is described as "Africa's most ambitious infrastructure expansion drive" :
- 90,000-kilometre nationwide fibre-optic rollout
- 3,700 additional telecom towers deployed in rural areas
- Procurement of two new communication satellites
- Expected to connect approximately 20 million currently unconnected Nigerians beginning in 2027
These projects are scheduled precisely to align with the 2027 elections. The infrastructure gap the Senate cites is being closed as they speak.
Question: If the government is investing billions to connect every local government, why are senators blocking the very use of that connectivity for elections?
On February 10, 2026, the Senate approved electronic transmission, but with a poisonous caveat . The new version states:
>"That the presiding officer shall electronically transmit the results from each polling unit to the IReV portal... PROVIDED that if electronic transmission fails and it becomes difficult to transmit the results, Form EC8A shall be the primary means of collation."
This is not a compromise. This is a backdoor. Here is why:
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has repeatedly clarified: the IReV portal is NOT a result collation system .
Paul Omokore, INEC's Director of ICT, stated explicitly: "Form EC8A is the result that we collated at the PUs. We use BVAS to snap this form and upload the same thing to the IReV portal for public viewing. This is not a collecting system. It does not tally a system" .
The Supreme Court has already drawn this distinction. In the 2023 presidential election petitions, the Court held that "the unavailability of results on the IReV portal alone was not a ground for nullifying an election" .
Translation: The Senate has mandated uploading to a viewing portal while simultaneously allowing manual Form EC8A to legally override those uploads whenever someone claims "technology failed."
Who Decides When Technology "Fails"?
This is the million-naira question. The amendment does not define:
- Who determines that transmission has "failed"
- What standard of proof is required
- What recourse exists if failure is deliberately engineered
The Coalition of United Political Parties (CUPP) called it correctly: "By tying electronic transmission to the unreliable caveat of system non-failure, the Senate has deliberately created a massive lacuna that can, and will be exploited by those who wield state authority" .
They described it as a "Wayo twist" that allows manual interference at collation centres whenever it suits those in power, under the pretext of technical glitches.
Let us revisit what happened in the 2023 general elections.
INEC Chairman Mahmood Yakubu had assured Nigerians: "We have tremendous experience in transmitting results real time in Nigeria. We successfully transmitted results for 105 constituencies nationwide".
Yet on election night, results were not being uploaded to the IReV portal. Labour Party Chairman Julius Abure raised the alarm that in Lagos State, home of the eventual winner "they have refused to upload the results for the presidential election" while uploading Senate and House results .
Samson Itodo of Yiaga Africa lamented: "This entire scenario cast a lot of doubt on the result of the elections" .
The result? 1,196 election petitions arising from the 2023 elections alone . This was a significant increase from 807 petitions in 2019 and 663 in 2015 .
Former INEC National Commissioner Festus Okoye has warned that the current amendment "fails to recognise the history of electoral reforms in the country, the progress achieved, and the interventions of the Supreme Court". He stated plainly that the amendments "pose a risk of electoral confusion and set a trap for the electoral process" .
On February 9, 2026, a coalition of civil society organizations, including TAF Africa, Centre for Media and Society, Kukah Centre, International Press Centre, Yiaga Africa, and others, issued an urgent call .
Jake Epelle, CEO of TAF Africa, expressed concern over "the Senate's rejection of real-time electronic transmission of results" and warned that "the divergence between the Senate and the House of Representatives could undermine the credibility, transparency and predictability of the 2027 general elections" .
The coalition specifically urged the conference committee to "adopt the House position on mandatory electronic transmission" .
The House of Representatives got it right. Their version required presiding officers to "electronically transmit results from each polling unit to IReV, with real-time uploads" . The Senate's version introduced the poison pill.
Senator Bamidele cited the Speedtest Global Index, ranking Nigeria 85th out of 105 countries in mobile network reliability . But this argument collapses under scrutiny.
India conducts elections for nearly 900 million voters using offline electronic voting machines powered by batteries, with voter-verifiable paper audit trails - eliminating reliance on live connectivity .
The Philippines combines local vote counting with hybrid transmission, using 3G, GPRS, satellite, or physical data transfer where signals are absent .
Brazil relies on secure, self-contained machines with controlled transmission protocols.
The common thread is redundancy, not retreat. No serious democracy abandons technological progress because of imperfect coverage, they build layered safeguards.
Nigeria's redundancy plan already exists: polling units in no-signal zones can transmit results via short-range connectivity or physical transfer to nearby satellite-enabled centers under the 774 LGA project .
The Call to Action: What We Must Demand
1. Mandatory Real-Time Transmission
We must demand that the National Assembly harmonization committee adopt the House of Representatives' position requiring mandatory, real-time electronic transmission without the "technology failure" escape clause .
2. Clear Legal Hierarchy
The law must establish that electronically transmitted results are the primary legal record, not merely a transparency tool subordinate to manual forms .
3. Independent Verification of "Failure"
If transmission failure is claimed, it must be independently verified by multiple stakeholders, not declared unilaterally by presiding officers or collation agents.
4. INEC's Immediate Issuance of Election Timetable
INEC must immediately issue the 2027 election timetable. Section 28(1) of the Electoral Act 2022 requires notice 360 days before election date . Every day of delay caused by legislative uncertainty is a day stolen from proper preparation.
5. Prosecution for Deliberate Infrastructure Sabotage
Any individual or entity found to have deliberately engineered "connectivity issues" to force manual override must face criminal prosecution for election fraud.
Naming Names: Those Who Would Steal Your Vote
Let us be clear about who is responsible:
The Senate Leadership—for inserting the poison clause and defending it with misleading infrastructure claims .
The Senators who supported this amendment—for choosing partisan advantage over democratic integrity.
The telecommunications operators who allegedly influenced the NCC's position shift—for providing convenient cover to those seeking to undermine electronic transmission .
Any conference committee member who compromises—for surrendering the House's principled position to political pressure.
The Stakes: What We Lose If We Remain Silent
Between 2007 and 2023, Nigeria recorded 4,675 election petitions from five general election cycles . The 2007 elections, widely regarded as the most flawed since 1999, produced 1,282 petitions. The 2023 elections produced 1,196 .
If the 2027 elections proceed under a framework where electronically transmitted results are legally secondary to manually collated forms, we are not just risking a repeat—we are guaranteeing an escalation .
Former INEC Commissioner Festus Okoye warned that the Commission could find itself "caught between public expectation and legal limitation during electoral disputes" .
This is the trap. And it is being set right now.
My fellow Nigerians, the infrastructure argument is dead. NIGCOMSAT-1R provides 100% rural coverage capacity. Project 774 is connecting every local government by end of 2026. Broadband penetration is approaching 50% and accelerating. The government is laying 90,000 kilometers of fiber and deploying 3,700 new towers .
Any senator who still claims we lack the capacity for electronic transmission is either willfully ignorant or deliberately deceptive.
The Senate's amendment is not about technology—it is about control. It is about preserving the ability to declare "technical failure" at will, to retreat to opaque manual processes, to override what the people voted.
We have seen this play before. In 2023, results were uploaded for Senate and House races but mysteriously "failed" for the presidential election in critical states . The pattern is consistent. The intention is clear.
To the Senate: Your "compromise" is an insult. Your infrastructure excuses are lies. Your caveat is a rigging clause dressed in legislative language. The Nigerian people see you.
To INEC: You know the capacity exists. You have clarified the IReV's limitations. Now stand firm against those who would use those limitations to steal mandates.
To civil society: Keep the pressure alive. Every protest, every statement, every demand matters.
To every Nigerian: This is not about APC or PDP or Labour Party. This is about whether your vote will mean anything in 2027. When they tell you "technology failed," ask them: Whose technology? Who failed? And who benefits?
The time for games is over. The 2027 elections are approaching. And we will not allow a handful of politicians to steal what belongs to 200 million Nigerians—not with lies, not with loopholes, and not with laws written in bad faith.
Demand mandatory, real-time, verifiable electronic transmission. Demand that every vote counts. Demand that those who would steal from us are named, shamed, and stopped.
Our democracy depends on it.
"The delay in concluding the electoral amendment introduces legal uncertainty that may compromise preparations for the 2027 elections." — Jake Epelle, TAF Africa, February 9, 2026
"This is not a collecting system. It does not tally a system." — Paul Omokore, INEC Director of ICT, on the IReV portal
"The Senate has once again demonstrated a blatant disregard for the aspirations of the Nigerian people for transparent, free, and fair elections." — Coalition of United Political Parties