The sudden death of General Sani Abacha in June 1998, followed shortly by M.K.O. Abiola’s death, created a significant political vacuum and an unexpected opportunity for a new transition to civilian rule. General Abdulsalam Abubakar, Abacha’s successor, promptly promised to transfer power to civilians, initiating a process that included freeing political prisoners and setting a timetable for the transition. The transition elections that ultimately ushered in the civilian regime in 1999 were acknowledged as “flawed” but were “tolerated because of the overriding desire to ease out the military”.
The nature of this return to democracy was profoundly shaped by the enduring concept of “prebendalism,” as articulated by Richard Joseph. Prebendalism describes the “centrality to the Nigerian polity of the intense struggle between opposing clientelist groups, most often ethno-clientelist groups, to control and exploit the offices of the state”. In this framework, state power is perceived not as a public trust but as an “array of prebends,” where the appropriation of public office grants access to the state treasury and control over lucrative licenses and contracts. This concept helps to illuminate the deep connections between the political mobilization of ethnicity and widespread corruption, often manifesting as the “neo-patrimonial” operation characteristic of many African administrations.
A direct manifestation of prebendalism in the Nigerian context is what is often termed the “politics of the belly” or patronage politics. This refers to a system where “immediate and pecuniary benefits” become the primary expectation of followers, and electoral outcomes are frequently determined by “money politics” rather than by a candidate’s performance or policy proposals. This practice involves the direct provision of material benefits to secure political support, often exploiting the economic vulnerability of the populace.
Even after 1999, the Nigerian political system continued to grapple with the “structural pathologies of statism and prebendalism”. Elections, while theoretically central to democratic accountability, largely served the “interests of the power elite” and had “little, if any, significant impact on deepening representative democracy” or genuinely improving the socio-economic lives of citizens. This indicates that the formal democratic structures were, in essence, co-opted by pre-existing patronage networks. The formal return to democracy, while ending military rule, did not fundamentally alter the underlying political economy characterized by prebendalism. Instead, it provided a new, ostensibly civilian, framework within which these extractive practices could continue and even flourish. This suggests that the form of governance changed, but the substance of elite behavior and the transactional relationship between the state and its citizens largely persisted. This failure to address deep-seated structural issues meant that the “new” democracy was built on shaky foundations, perpetuating a cycle of underdevelopment and elite capture.
Numerous examples from electoral outcomes in the Fourth Republic illustrate the beneficiaries of these prebendal practices:
- General Olusegun Obasanjo (1999 PDP Presidential Primaries): His victory was significantly influenced by the “financial capability of the supporters” of the aspirants, particularly “powerful financiers” and “notable retired generals such as TY Danjuma, Ali Mohammadu Gusau, Mohammadu Wushishi and IB Babangida”. This demonstrates how financial muscle and elite backing, rather than democratic credentials or popular performance, could determine political outcomes.
- Governor Ayodele Fayose (Ekiti State 2014 Governorship Election): His re-election was closely linked to his “populist agenda” and his ability to “cash in on the vulnerability of the army of jobless young people” through the “politics of stomach infrastructure”. This involved directly addressing the “immediate needs and aspirations of local artisans, labourers, drivers and other categories of transporters, as well as lower-cadre public servants”.
- Governor Rauf Aregbesola (Osun State 2014 Governorship Election): While his re-election was also associated with competence and infrastructural development, it likely involved “taking care of many of the personal needs of the ordinary people by way of patronage and politics of the belly.” This included programs like O-Meal (free student feeding), O-YES (youth employment), monthly stipends for widows and the aged, and free railway services during festivities.
- Christopher Iyiola Omisore (Osun State 2014 Governorship Election): He leveraged his “closeness to many influential members of the Senate and Presidency” and “unrestrained access to sensitive material, and, more importantly, to resources pivotal to Nigeria’s patronage system and politics of the belly”. His electoral victory in his place of origin, Ife, exemplified “identity politics” as a manifestation of the patronage system.
- President Goodluck Jonathan and the PDP (Lagos State 2015 Governorship Election): The PDP’s improved performance in Lagos was linked to President Jonathan’s alleged “extensive distribution of money to party stalwarts, traditional and other opinion leaders” in the state and neighboring South-West communities.
- Akinwunmi Ambode (Lagos State 2015 Governorship Election): His emergence as governor was “traceable to clientele politics more than to outstanding performance,” largely attributed to the “well-heeled machinery of the APC that was obviously controlled by Bola Tinubu,” a prominent financier.
- The Oodua People’s Congress (OPC): This group allegedly engaged in violent acts and demonstrations, reportedly motivated by a “widely reported contract for the surveillance of oil pipelines” and other inducements received from the PDP-led federal government.
The paper on patronage politics concludes that Nigeria “will have to contend with the politics of underdevelopment for as long as immediate and pecuniary benefits constitute the expectation of the generality of followers”. This “politics of the belly” creates a perverse incentive structure where politicians are rewarded for short-term, clientelist handouts rather than for implementing sustainable policies that address fundamental societal problems like poverty, unemployment, and lack of public services. This perpetuates a cycle of dependency and underdevelopment, as resources that could be invested in broad-based growth are instead channeled into maintaining patronage networks. It also suggests a cynical exploitation of the populace’s economic vulnerability, undermining genuine democratic participation and accountability.